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Introduction
This dissertation comprises four essays on the topic of industrial organization
and environmental economics. The rst essay investigates the protability of
horizontal mergers of rms with price adjustments. We take a di¤erential game
approach and both the open-loop as well as the closed-loop equlibria are con-
sidered. In the second essay, using the same approach as the rst one, we study
the protability of horizontal merger of rms where the demand function is non-
linear. We take into consideration the open-loop equilibrium. The third essay
studies the protability of exogenous output constraint in a di¤erential game
model with price dynamics under the feedback strategies. The fourth essay in-
vestigates a second-best trade agreement between two countries when pollution
spillovers are asymmetric to examine the strategic behavior of governments in
using pollution taxes and tari¤s under trade liberalization.
In chapter 1, taking a di¤erential game approach with sticky prices in an
oligopolistic industry, I have analyzed the consequences of horizontal mergers
both in the open-loop and the closed-loop solutions. In view of the fact that I
wanted to concentrate on the incentives to merge that are generated by price dy-
namics, I have assumed away any e¢ ciency e¤ects. It turns out that for a given
level of the discount rate, merger incentives are higher when the mechanism
governing price adjustment is very slow. When price is very sticky, the dynamic
Cournot equilibrium price approaches the competitive equilibrium price of the
static game in which rms set price equal to marginal cost. Firms would like to
play the correct Cournot equilibrium but they cannot because price adjusts very
slowly and in this aggressive environment they have an incentive to decrease the
v
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number of competitors through merger in order to make a slight correction in
output setting mistakes and recover what they are losing.
Moreover, its results suggest that the relative number of rms that is required
for merger to be protable has two divergent trends under open-loop and closed-
loop information structures. When rms play closed-loop, it is a decreasing
function of the population of rms in the industry while for the open-loop it is
the opposite. Accordingly, the larger the relevant information set, the higher is
the possibility of collusion between rms. Given that pushing competition has
a contradictory outcome under the closed-loop rule; it is worthwhile for policy
makers and antitrust authorities to consider as well the nature of competition
in the industry.
In the second chapter, we take a di¤erential game approach with price dy-
namics to conduct an investigation into the consequences of horizontal merger of
rms where the demand function is nonlinear. Given the shape of the problem
at hand, we have analyzed the open-loop solution only. We show that in relation
to the fact that the demand is nonlinear and prices follow some stickiness an
incentive for small merger exists, while it does not appear under the standard
approach using a linear demand function.
In our model, any decrease in the number of rms brings about a decrease
in social welfare via a decrease in consumer surplus. Given the fact that, in
principle, when there is no saving on the overall industry costs, any horizontal
merger is socially harmful, and then the regulator must look out for mergers
driven by the pressure generated by market size on rms, when the demand
is non-linear. This has some interesting implications on the empirical side,
as estimating market demand functions may indeed yield clearcut hints as to
whether the market under consideration is likely to generate incentives towards
horizontal mergers.
The third chapter examines protability of exogenous output constraints. In
a series of papers Gaudet and Salant (1991a,b) show that, in the case of Cournot
competition among producers of perfect substitutes, a marginal contraction is
vii
strictly benecial if and only if the number of rms in the designated subset
exceeds the "adjusted" number of rms outside it by strictly more than one.
In the special case of linear cost and demand functions, the rms in the subset
will gain from an exogenously marginal contraction of their output if and only
if they outnumber the rms outside the subset by more than one.
In this paper we generalize this result to the case of dynamic competition
instead of looking at the one-shot game. While in the standard Cournot model
any output constraint is not to the benet of constrained rms, in this paper,
we show that when rms play a dynamic Cournot game with Markov-perfect
strategies, exogenous output constraint by a subset of rms results in: (i) in-
crease in the value of unconstraint rms irrelevant of the amount of constraint
because of having less intensive competition, (ii) increase in the market price for
any output constraint below the optimal level and slightly above that because
of lowering the total output caused by less competition and (iii) increase in the
value of constrained rms for a viable range of parameters and initial conditions
because of increasing the price during the price path. Our analysis has some ap-
plications to voluntary export restraints (VER), Mergers, Economics Sanctions,
etc.
Finally, in the last chapter, we would like to examine the welfare implications
of trade liberalization when governments behave strategically using environmen-
tal policy with asymmetric pollution spillovers. We investigated a second-best
trade agreement between two countries to examine the strategic behavior of
governments in using pollution taxes and tari¤s under trade liberalization.
We found that when the marginal cost of pollution of the domestic rm
increases, the pollution-shifting motive is enhanced and government wants to
raise production taxes and surprisingly the rent-seeking behavior is observed
and government raises import tari¤s. On the other hand, when the marginal
cost of pollution of the foreign rm increases, government want to reduce the
level of tax and interestingly the level of tari¤ as well.
viii
Part I
Essays in Dynamic Cournot
Competition
1

Chapter 1
Protability of Horizontal
Mergers in the Presence of
Price Stickiness
1.1 Introduction
When quantity-setting rms compete in a homogenous product industry with
symmetric cost and the same demand functions, horizontal merger is modeled as
an exogenous change in market structure. As a result, the level of competition
decreases which increases the market price and market power of rms as well.
In the case of linear demand and cost functions, the resulting anticompetitive
forces are mostly to the benet of outsiders and mergers are advantageous to
the merging rm just in the circumstance that market share of merging rm is
extremely high, at least 80% which is almost merging to a monopoly (Salant,
Switzer and Reynolds, 1983 (henceforth SSR); Gaudet and Salant, 1991, 1992).
Keeping everything the same, this threshold will be reduced to 50% (which
is again a considerable market share) provided that the merged entity is not
restricted to remain a Cournot player after the merger (Levin, 1990) or any
demand function which satises the second-order conditions is allowed (Cheung,
1992). There are other studies showing that mergers are privately protable if
they are leader-generating (in industries where about less than one-third of the
rms are leaders) (Daughety, 1990), or if merger generates synergies (Perry and
3
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Porter, 1985; Farrell and Shapiro, 1990). However, the incentive to merge always
exists once price is employed as the strategic variable rather than quantity. In
a di¤erentiated product industry, Deneckere and Davidson (1985) demonstrate
that mergers of any size are benecial if rms are engaged in a price-setting
game.
We want to conduct an investigation into the consequences of horizontal
mergers in oligopoly Cournot competition in the presence of price stickiness.
When prices are sticky, for a given level of output the actual market price of a
product does not adjust instantaneously to the price indicated by its demand
function and price adjustment takes time. Since prices evolve over time we
need a dynamic framework to investigate the e¤ect of price stickiness on the
protability of horizontal mergers.
Using an oligopolistic di¤erential game model with sticky prices in the spe-
cic case of instantaneous price adjustment, Dockner and Gaunersdorfer (2001)
through a numerical analysis show that, contrary to the static game, in a dy-
namic Cournot game where rms use feedback strategies mergers are always
protable independently of the number of merging rms. Their result suggests
that to analyzing merger, it is important to consider the nature of competition
in the industry. Besides focusing on the same issue analytically, Benchekroun
(2003) shows that when rms use open-loop strategies merger is protable only
if the market share of the merged rm is signicant enough, very similar to
the SSR results, which put more emphasis on the role of feedback strategies to
create incentive to merge.
In this paper, we take a general approach without introducing specic as-
sumptions on the degree of price stickiness to investigate the bearings of price
dynamics. Scale economies as a motive for merger is ruled out by assumption
because we would like to concentrate on the incentives to merge that are gen-
erated by price dynamics. To this end, we take a di¤erential game approach
to price dynamics introduced by Simaan and Takayama (1978) and its exten-
sion by Fershtman and Kamien (1987) and Cellini and Lambertini (2004, 2007).
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We take into consideration both the open-loop and closed-loop (memoryless)1
equilibria to investigate how the speed of adjustment can a¤ect the protability
of horizontally merged rms. There emerges, when price adjust with a very
sticky mechanism, mergers with a small number of insiders but large number
of outsiders are also privately protable even if rms play open-loop. Further-
more, by guring out the least market share required for merger to be protable
when price adjusts instantaneously, we revisit the closed-loop e¤ect to generate
incentive to merge.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the
layout of the model. Sections 3 illustrate the open-loop and closed-loop equilib-
ria. The assessment of incentives towards mergers is given in section 4. Section
5 concludes the paper.
1.2 The setup
Consider a dynamic oligopoly market where n symmetric rms, at any t 2
[0;1), produce quantities qi(t)  0; i 2 f1; 2; :::; ng ; of the same homogeneous
good with concave technologies described by the quadratic cost functions
Ci (t) = cqi(t) +
1
2
q2i (t); c > 0: (1.1)
In each period, the product price, p^(t), is determined by means of the inverse
demand function
p^(t) = A 
nX
i=1
qi(t): (1.2)
1Broadly speaking, the main di¤erence between the open-loop equilibrium on one hand
and the feedback and closed-loop equilibria on the other is that the former does not take into
account strategic interaction between players through the evolution of state variables over
time and the associated adjustment in controls. Under the open-loop rule, players choose
their respective plans at the initial date and commit to them forever. Therefore, in general,
open-loop equilibria are not subgame perfect, in that they are only weakly time consistent
since players make their action by the clockonly.
A further distinction can be made between the closed-loop equilibrium and the feedback
equilibrium, which are both strongly time consistent and, therefore, subgame perfect since, at
any date  , players decide by the stockof all state variables. However, while the closed-loop
memoryless equilibrium takes into account the initial and current levels of all state variables,
the feedback equilibrium accounts for the accumulated stock of each state variable at the
current date. Hence, the feedback equilibrium is a closed-loop equilibrium, while the opposite
is not true in general [2].
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However, since price is sticky, the actual market price does not adjust instan-
taneously to the price given by the demand function. That is, p^(t) will di¤er
from the current price level, p(t), and price moves according to the following
equation
dp(t)
dt
 _p(t) = s fp^(t)  p(t)g ; (1.3)
where s 2 [0;1) is a constant that determines the speed of price adjustment.
The lower is s, the higher is the degree of price stickiness. When s goes to
innity, price is not sticky and the actual market price is equal to the price
given by the demand function.
The instantaneous prot function of rm i is
i(t) = qi(t)

p(t)  c  1
2
qi(t)

:
Therefore, the maximization problem of rm i is
max
qi(t)
Ji =
1Z
0
e tqi(t)

p(t)  c  1
2
qi(t)

dt; (1.4)
subject to (2.2), p(0) = p0 and p(t)  0 for all t 2 [0;1). The factor e t
discounts future gains, and the discount rate  is assumed to be constant and
equal across rms.
We solve the di¤erential game using both the open-loop information struc-
ture where rms choose their production plans at the initial date and stick to
them for the whole time horizon and the closed-loop memoryless information
structure where rmsquantity choices at any time depend on the initial and
current levels of all state variables (here, price).
According to Cellini and Lambertini (2004), the steady state levels of the
price and the individual output of a dynamic oligopoly game with price adjust-
ments which are the premerger solution of our problem at the open-loop Nash
equilibrium are
pOL = A  nqOL ; qOL = (A  c)(+ s)
(1 + n)+ (2 + n)s
; (1.5)
and at the closed-loop Nash equilibrium are
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pCL = A  nqCL ; qCL = (A  c)(+ ns)
s+ (1 + n)(+ ns)
: (1.6)
The corresponding single period prots are
OL =
(A  c)2(+ s)(+ 3s)
2 [(1 + n)+ (2 + n)s]
2 ; 
CL =
(a  c)2(+ ns)(+ (2 + n)s)
2 [s+ (1 + n)(+ ns)]
2 :
The superscripts OL and CL indicate the open-loop and closed-loop equilibrium
level of a variable, respectively.
For later reference, let us also note that in the static game where the demand
and cost functions are specied by (3.1) and (1.2) in turn, the equilibrium prices
when rms play à la Cournot and à la Bertrand respectively are
pCN =
2A+ nc
n+ 2
; (1.7)
pBN =
A+ nc
n+ 1
: (1.8)
1.3 The merger equilibrium
In this section, we consider a horizontal merger of m rms (1 < m  n) where
they act collusively to maximize their discounted joint prots.2 n   m rms
stay outside the merger. Hence, the di¤erential game becomes
max
qi
Jm =
1Z
0
e t
"
(p(t)  c)
mX
i=1
qi(t)  1
2
mX
i=1
q2i (t)
#
dt; i = 1; :::;m (1.9)
max
qj(t)
Jj =
1Z
0
e tqj(t)

p(t)  c  1
2
qj(t)

dt; j = m+ 1; :::; n (1.10)
subject to
dp(t)
dt
 _p(t) = s
8<:A 
mX
i=1
qi(t) 
nX
j=m+1
qj(t)  p(t)
9=; ; (1.11)
and to the initial conditions p(0) = p0 and p(t)  0.
2Given the convex cost function, it is optimal to produce with all m rms, and not to
concentrate production on one rm only.
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qi(t)  0; i 2 f1; 2; :::;mg and qj(t)  0; j 2 fm+ 1; :::; ng denote, in turn,
the output level of an insider and an outsider. JM and Jj represent the problem
of the merging rm and outsiders, respectively.
According to (1.9), (2.5) and (3.36), the Hamiltonian functions of merging
rms and outsiders are
HM (t) = e t
(
(p(t)  c)
mX
i=1
qi(t)  1
2
mX
i=1
q2i (t) (1.12)
+i(t)s
24A  mX
i=1
qi(t) 
nX
j=m+1
qj(t)  p(t)
359=; ;
Hj(t) = e
 t

qj(t)

p(t)  c  1
2
qj(t)

(1.13)
+j(t)s
24A  mX
i=1
qi(t) 
nX
j=m+1
qj(t)  p(t)
359=; ;
where j(t) = j (t) e
t and i(t) = i (t) e
t and j (t) and i (t) are the co-
state variables associated with p(t).
1.3.1 Open-loop equilibrium
After the merger, at the open-loop Nash equilibrium, the steady state levels of
the price and the output of merging rm and outsiders are
pOLpost = A  qOLM   (n m) qOLO ;
qOLM = m (+ 2s) ; q
OL
O =  (+ s+ms) ;
where
 =
(A  c) (+ s)
(n+ 1) 2 + [2n+m (n m+ 2) + 3] s+ [n+m (n m+ 3) + 2] s2 :
The subscripts M and O indicate the equilibrium level of a variable for the
merging rm and an outsider and subscripts post refers to the equilibrium level
the price after the merger. Hence, the steady state equilibrium prots are as
follows
OLM =
2m (+ 2s)
2
(+ s+ 2ms)
2 (+ s)
; OLO =
2(+ 3s)(+ s+ms)2
2(+ s)
:
For the proof you can see Benchekroun (2003).
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1.3.2 Closed-loop equilibrium
Now, we look for the post-merger Nash equilibrium under the closed-loop strate-
gies. The outcome is summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 At the closed-loop Nash equilibrium, the steady state levels of
the price and the output of merging rm and outsiders are
pCLpost = A  qCLM   (n m) qCLO ; (1.14)
qCLM = m (+ (n m+ 1) s)
 
+
 
m2  m+ n+ 1 s ; (1.15)
qCLO = (+ s (n+ 1))
 
+ (m2  m+ n)s ; (1.16)
where
 = (A  c) = (n+ 1) 2 +  n  m2  m+ 2n+ 3+ 2 s
+
 
(n+ 1)
 
m2n mn+ n2 + n+ 1 m4 +m3 s2
which yields the steady state equilibrium prots
CLM =
1
2
2m(+ (n m+ 1) s)(+ (n+m+ 1) s)(+ (m2  m+ n+ 1)s)2
CLO =
1
2
2(+ s (n+ 1))2
 
+ (m2  m+ n)s  + (m2  m+ n+ 2)s
Proof. Taking the rst-order conditions w.r.t. qi(t) and qj(t) and using (2.7)
and (2.8), in turn, we have
@HM (t)
@qi(t)
= p (t)  c  qi(t)  i(t)s = 0; (1.17)
@Hj(t)
@qj(t)
= p (t)  c  qj(t)  j(t)s = 0; (1.18)
which yields the optimal closed-loop output for, respectively, the insiders and
outsiders as follows
qCLi (t) =

p (t)  c  i(t)s if p (t) > c+ i(t)s;
0 otherwise,
(1.19)
qCLj (t) =

p (t)  c  j(t)s if p (t) > c+ j(t)s;
0 otherwise.
(1.20)
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The adjoint equations for the optimum are
 @H
M (t)
@p(t)
 
nX
j=m+1
@HM (t)
@qj(t)
@qCLj (t)
@p(t)
=
@i(t)
@t
  i(t); (1.21)
 @Hj(t)
@p(t)
 
nX
k=m+1;
k 6=j
@Hj(t)
@qk(t)
@qCLk (t)
@p(t)
 m
mX
i=1
@Hj(t)
@qi(t)
@qCLi (t)
@p(t)
=
@i(t)
@t
  i(t):
(1.22)
The transversality conditions are
lim
t!1 i(t):p (t) = 0; limt!1j(t):p (t) = 0:
From (1.19) and (1.20) we obtain
@qCLj (t)
@p(t)
=
@qCLk (t)
@p(t)
=
@qCLi (t)
@p(t)
= 1: (1.23)
The di¤erence between the closed-loop and open-loop solutions is due to these
terms in equations (1.21) and (1.22) which are set equal to zero in the open-
loop case.3 That is, when rms play closed-loop strategies, each rm inserts
her information regarding the dependency of the other rmssupply policy on
the current market price into the adjoint equation. The additional terms in the
co-state equations (1.21) and (1.22) imply the strategic interaction among rms,
which are not considered by denition in the open-loop solution. Furthermore,
the adjoint equation of merging rm (1.21) is di¤erent from the adjoint equation
of an outsider (1.22). Since there is a cartel inside the group of insiders, there
is no strategic interaction among insiders while looking at (1.22) we recognize
that in addition to the strategic interaction between each outsider and any of
the insiders there are strategic interactions among outsiders.
Di¤erentiating (2.7) and (2.8) w.r.t. the co-state variables and using (2.3),
equations (1.21) and (1.22) can be rewritten as
 
mX
i=1
qi(t) + i(t)s 
nX
j=m+1
i(t)s =
@i(t)
@t
  i(t);
3 In the open-loop solution, the adjoint equations for the optimum for insiders and outsiders
are as follows, respectively
 @H
M (t)
@p(t)
=  
mP
i=1
qi(t) + i(t)s =
@i(t)
@t
;  @Hj(t)
@p(t)
=  qj(t) + j(t)s =
@j(t)
@t
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 qj(t) + j(t)s 
nX
k=m+1;
k 6=j
j(t)s m
mX
i=1
j(t)s =
@i(t)
@t
  i(t):
Inducing symmetry assumption, we obtain
@(t)
@t
=  mq(t) + [(m  n+ 1) s+ ] (t); (1.24)
@(t)
@t
=  q(t) +   m2   n+m+ 2 s+ (t): (1.25)
Di¤erentiating (1.19) and (1.20) w.r.t. time and using (1.24) and (1.25) we nd
dq(t)
dt
=
dp (t)
dt
   mq(t) + [(m  n+ 1) s+ ] (t) s; (1.26)
dq(t)
dt
=
dp (t)
dt
   q(t) +   m2   n+m+ 2 s+ (t) s: (1.27)
Using (3.36), (1.19) and (1.20) where a symmetry assumption is introduced for
an individual rm output inside the group of insiders and also the group of
outsiders, we can rewrite (1.26) and (1.27) as follows
dq(t)
dt
= sA+ [(n m  1) s  ] c+ [(m  n) s+ ] p (t)
 s (n m) q(t) + [(n m  1) s  ] q(t);
dq(t)
dt
= sA+ c
 
m2 + n m  2 s    smq(t)
+
  m2   n+m+ 1 s+  p(t) +  m2   1 s   q(t):
dq(t)=dt = 0, dq(t)=dt = 0 and dp(t)=dt = 0, which are linear relationships
between p, q and q, yield the steady state of the system and the equilibrium
point is a saddle with (1.14), (1.15) and (1.16).
Keeping symmetry assumption in the group of insiders as well as the group of
outsiders, the two groups are necessarily asymmetric. Because essentially there
is a cartel among insiders while the rest of the market behave like dynamic
Cournot competitors. These asymmetries between the two groups are not only
with respect to the rst-order conditions and controls but in particular with
respect to the co-state amounts. By construction, the list of co-state values
entails that the shadow price attached by any outsider will be systematically
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di¤erent from the shadow price attached to the price dynamics by one of the
insiders. Considering (1.17) and (1.18), we can rewrite the FOCs for outsiders
as (t) = p (t)  c  q(t)=s and insiders as (t) = p (t)  c  q(t)=s. Then, taking
into account the fact that the output level of an outsider is greater than the
output level of a single insider, we have the following consequence
Corollary 2 The shadow price of an insider is greater than an outsiders
 
(t) > (t)

.
This entails that the proportional change of merging rms prot, on account
of alteration in the state equation, is more than that of an outsider.
1.4 The incentive to merge
After nding the post-merger equilibrium, we are able to investigate the prof-
itability of a horizontal merger with price dynamics in a Cournot competition.
First, we gure out the minimum percentage of insiders which is required to
make the merger protable in the case of instantaneous price adjustment. Then,
we evaluate merger protability in the space (m; s=) for a given initial pop-
ulation of rms to perceive the role of price stickiness in stimulating merger
incentives.
To deal with the above mentioned issues, we will consider the di¤erence
between the post-merger prot of the merging rm and sum of the individual
prots of the insiders before the merger which has to be positive as a condition
for merger protability. That is, in an n-rm industry, m rms will nd it prof-
itable to merge if and only if the merger protability condition OLM  mOL > 0
(open-loop) or CLM  mCL > 0 (closed-loop) holds.
When the speed of price adjustment goes to innity, Dockner and Gauners-
dorfer (2001) and Benchekroun (2003) showed that when rms use feedback
strategies mergers are always protable irrespective of the number of insiders
whereas we will show that it is not the case for the closed-loop (memoryless) and
open-loop strategies and a su¢ cient proportion of rms is required. However,
as compared to the open-loop, this proportion is very di¤erent when rms play
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closed-loop. Figure 1 illustrates corresponding results graphically. From this
graph we can see that as the population of rms in the industry increases, the
minimum proportion of rms that makes the merger protable has a decreasing
trend under the closed-loop strategies while it has an increasing trend under the
open-loop strategies. Thus, we can argue that it is much easier to maintain col-
lusion among insiders in the closed-loop equilibrium than the open-loop. This
di¤erence is due to the fact that "open-loop" and "closed-loop" refer to the two
di¤erent information structures. In both cases, everybody operate under the
complete information but, as it is explained in previous section in detail, un-
der the closed-loop information structure rms explicitly incorporate strategic
interactions in the co-state equations while in the open-loop they do not.
In gure 2, the region of parameters s and  for which merger of m rms is
protable is represented by means of two dividing curves under the open-loop
and closed-loop equilibria in a ten-rm industry. We provide this graph to show
that in cases where price is too sticky, merger would be to the benet of merging
rm even if its market share is low.
In this gure we can see that in the open-loop equilibrium when the speed
of adjustment goes to innity, merger must involve at least eight insiders to
become protable. As it is investigated by Fershtman and Kamien ([9], pp.
1159-1161), in the limit where s tends to innity, the open-loop equilibrium
(1.5) coincides with the static Cournot Nash equilibrium (1.7) and we know
that in the static Cournot model merger is disadvantageous to the merging
rm unless the market share of merging rm is su¢ ciently high (at least 80%).
However, in the closed-loop Nash equilibrium, as this gure clearly displays,
merger of four rms in ten-rm industry is always protable which is due to the
closed-loop rule properties explained earlier.
1.4. The incentive to merge 14
Figure 1: The lowest proportion of rms to be merged to make a protable
merger for the instantaneous price adjustment.
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For a given level of discount rate, as the population of insiders decreases,
the speed of price adjustment must reduce as well in order to make the merger
protable. This means that for a given rate of discounting, merger incentives
are higher when the speed of price adjustment is slower. Irrespective of the
information structure, if the price adjusts very slowly, the equilibrium price is
very close to the perfectly competitive one (in the limit, if s = 0, it collapses
onto the competitive price (A+nc)=(n+1), as in (1.8)4). In games where rms
are Bertrand competitors in homogeneous goods - like here - the protability of
mergers is driven by the increase in market price generated by the reduction in
the population of rms, that benets insiders and outsiders alike 5
4Also, the features of the feedback equilibrium in the limit where the discount rate tends
to innity is looked into by Fershtman and Kamien ([9], pp. 1159) and they demonstrated
that in such circumstances, the feedback equilibrium coincides with the Bertrand equilibrium
of the static game.
5For the detailed analysis of the same problem under product di¤erentiation, see Deneckere
and Davidson (1985).
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Figure 2: Merger protability in the space (m; s=) for n = 10
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1.5 Conclusions
Taking a di¤erential game approach with sticky prices in an oligopolistic in-
dustry, we have analyzed the consequences of horizontal mergers both in the
open-loop and the closed-loop solutions. In view of the fact that we wanted to
concentrate on the incentives to merge that are generated by price dynamics,
we have assumed away any e¢ ciency e¤ects. It turns out that for a given level
of the discount rate, merger incentives are higher when the mechanism gov-
erning price adjustment is very slow. When price is very sticky, the dynamic
Cournot equilibrium price approaches the competitive equilibrium price of the
static game in which rms set price equal to marginal cost. Firms would like to
play the correct Cournot equilibrium but they cannot because price adjusts very
slowly and in this aggressive environment they have an incentive to decrease the
number of competitors through merger in order to make a slight correction in
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output setting mistakes and recover what they are losing.
Moreover, our results suggest that the relative number of rms that is re-
quired for merger to be protable has two divergent trends under open-loop and
closed-loop information structures. When rms play closed-loop, it is a decreas-
ing function of the population of rms in the industry while for the open-loop it
is the opposite. Accordingly, the larger the relevant information set, the higher
is the possibility of collusion between rms. Given that pushing competition has
a contradictory outcome under the closed-loop rule; it is worthwhile for policy
makers and antitrust authorities to consider as well the nature of competition
in the industry.
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Chapter 2
The Protability of Small
Horizontal Mergers with
Nonlinear Demand
Functions
2.1 Introduction
The existing literature on the protability of horizontal mergers within the static
Cournot framework demonstrates that a merger will be protable to the merging
rms provided that either the number of merging rms is large enough (typically,
too large to be realistic) or the merger creates a strong synergy (typically, a
reduction in the average costs bringing about the well known e¢ ciency defense).
Convincing illustrations of these claims can be found in Salant, Switzer and
Reynolds (1983) and Farrell and Shapiro (1990), respectively. The subsequent
contributions have enriched the discussion along much the same lines. Levin
(1990) and Cheung (1992), using di¤erent setups, demonstrate that at least
50% of the market should merge to provide a protable merger. Gaudet and
Salant (1991, 1992) show that if a subset of rms were to produce below their
Cournot equilibrium quantity, their prots would fall if the subset of rms is
not large enough. the e¢ ciency argument is rst advocated by Perry and Porter
(1985), showing that if rms can benet from some economies of scale the merger
will become protable, and then extensively discussed by Farrell and Shapiro
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(1990), who nd that a horizontal merger that does not generate synergies raises
the price and this price increase can make the merger protable only when the
market share of merging rm is large enough.
All of the above is based upon a static approach. There are also studies
addressing the protability of mergers using dynamic models. Dockner and
Gaunersdorfer (2001), through a numerical analysis, and Benchekroun (2003),
analytically, revisit the di¤erential game introduced by Fershtman and Kamien
(1987) to assess horizontal mergers among rms that compete in a dynamic
Cournot oligopoly with price adjustments. They consider feedback and open-
loop equilibria where the demand function is linear. Cellini and Lambertini
(2007) model the optimal capacity and output decisions of oligopolistic rms in
a dynamic game with capital accumulation a la Ramsey. Borrowing the non-
linear demand structure from Anderson and Engers (1992, 1994), they allow
for non-linear market demand functions. They use this setup to investigate the
role of horizontal mergers in driving the economy towards the Ramsey modied
golden rule.
Here, we take an alternative route to the analysis of the incentive to carry
out small mergers table when the pre-merging degree of concentration is high
but any cost saving through the merger is ruled out by assumption. To do this,
we take a di¤erential game approach with sticky price dynamics à la Simaan
and Takayama (1978) and Fershtman and Kamien (1987), combined with a non-
linear demand structure à la Anderson and Engers (1992, 1994). Given that the
resulting maximization problem does not take any of the forms for which we
have a candidate for the value function, we take into consideration the open-
loop equilibrium only, focussing on the interplay between price stickiness and
the curvature of demand. The main point we make in this paper boils down
to the following: as the market shrinks because demand becomes convex, rms
bear increasing prot losses, and this creates an incentive for small mergers that
would not appear under the standard approach with a linear demand function.
Additionally, our analysis also singles out the existence of a parameter region
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where the merger between two rms out of three is always protable, for any
degree of price stickiness as well as for some degree of concavity of the demand
function.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the
layout of the model. Sections 3 illustrate the pre-merger open-loop equilibrium.
The assessment of prot incentives towards small mergers is carried out section
4. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 The setup
Consider a dynamic oligopoly where n symmetric rms produce the same ho-
mogeneous good over continuous time t 2 [0;1) ; all of them with the same
constant average and marginal cost c = 0. The notional market demand func-
tion is dened as follows:
Q(t) = A  (p^(t)) ;  > 0:
The above function is always downward sloping, and can be either convex
(0 <  < 1) or concave ( > 1). If  = 1; it is linear. In each period, the market
price p^(t) is determined by the following inverse demand function:
p^(t) = (A Q (t))
1
 : (2.1)
where Q (t) =
nP
i=1
qi(t) is the industry output and qi(t)  0; i 2 f1; 2; :::; ng is
the individual output of rm i at time t.
However, since price is sticky, the actual market price does not adjust in-
stantaneously to the notional price level (2.1). That is, p^(t) will di¤er from the
current price level p(t) at any time except that in steady state, with the price
moving according to the following equation:
dp(t)
dt
 _p(t) = s fp^(t)  p(t)g ; (2.2)
where s (0 < s <1) is a constant parameter that determines the speed of ad-
justment. The lower is s, the higher is the degree of price stickiness.
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The instantaneous prot function of rm i is
i(t) = p(t)qi(t):
Therefore, the objective of rm i is
max
qi(t)
Ji =
1Z
0
e tp(t)qi(t)dt; (2.3)
subject to (2.2) and to the initial condition p(0) = p0 and the non-negativity
condition p(t)  0 for all t 2 [0;1). The factor e t discounts future gains, and
the discount rate  is assumed to be constant and equal across rms.
The elasticity of demand function (2.1) w.r.t. price, "Q;P , can be written as
follows:
j"Q;P j =   @Q ()
@p (Q ())
:
p (Q ())
Q ()
=
p
A  p :
2.3 The pre-merger Cournot equilibrium
We consider the sum of the consumer surplus and the individual prots of the
present rms as the appropriate measure of the social welfare level. Since the
marginal cost is zero, the social welfare is the full integral of the curve up to the
optimal level of output, Q:
SW =
Z Q
0
(A  z)
1
 dz =

1 + 

A
+1
   (A Q)
+1


(2.4)
Here, since there is no xed cost, the merger cannot be carried out and
justied on the basis of an e¢ ciency argument, and we are not going to dwell
upon whether any merger might be socially acceptable. Accordingly, we will
focus solely on the rmsincentives.
In solving the quantity-setting game between prot-seeking agents, we shall
focus upon a single representative rm, whose Hamiltonian function is:1
1Observe that the maximand is neither state linear, linear-quadratic nor exponential, and
therefore we cannot specify the value function in view of the closed-form feedback solution
of the resulting Bellman equation. For an overview of di¤erential games allowing for the
analytical characterisation of the feedback equilibrium, see Dockner et al. (2000, ch. 7).
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Hi(t) = e
 t

qi(t)p(t) + (t)s

(A  qi(t) Q i (t))
1
   p(t)

; (2.5)
where (t) =  (t) et,  (t) being the co-state variable associated to p(t).
As a rst step, we can prove the following:
Proposition 3 At the open-loop Nash equilibrium, the steady state levels of the
price and the output of rm i are
q =
A (+ s)
s+ n (+ s)
;
p = (A  nq)
1
 :
The equilibrium is a saddle point for all   1; while it is unstable for all
 2 (0; 1) :
Proof. Taking the rst-order condition (FOC) on (2.5) w.r.t. qi(t); we obtain
p (t)  1

s(t) (A  qi(t) Q i (t))
1
 1 = 0: (2.6)
which seems to be unsolvable because of the exponent
1

 1. In general, what is
done is to take the FOC, solve it w.r.t. the control variable and then di¤erentiate
w.r.t. time. What we actually want is not the explicit solution of (3.36) w.r.t.
qi(t); but rather a control equation describing the evolution of the individual
output over time. Hence, we can di¤erentiate the FOC (3.36) w.r.t. time in the
rst place and then, by introducing a symmetry condition qi(t) = qj(t) = q(t)
for all i; j on outputs, we get the control equation as follows:
dq (t)
dt
= _q (t) =
(A  nq (t))1 
1


s _(t) (A  nq (t))
1
   2 (A  nq (t)) _p (t)

ns (1  )(t) :
(2.7)
Then, we can solve the FOC (3.36) to obtain optimal value of shadow price at
any instant t:
(t) =
p (t) (A  nq (t))1 
1

s
: (2.8)
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Now, we di¤erentiate the Hamiltonian w.r.t. the state variable to build up the
co-state equation:
 @Hi(t)
@p(t)
=  q(t) + (t)s = @(t)
@t
=) _(t) = @(t)
@t
= (t)(s+ )  q(t); (2.9)
and nally we have to account for the transversality condition:
lim
t!1(t):p (t) = 0:
Now observe that (2.2) and (2.8) together with the (3.35) can be plugged into
(2.7) to rewrite the control equation explicitly. The stationarity condition at the
steady state equilibrium requires (i) _q (t) to be equal to zero, and (ii) p (t) to be
equal to p^; so that the resulting coordinates of the unique open-loop equilibrium
point are:
q =
A (+ s)
s+ n (+ s)
;
p = (A  nq)
1
 :
The stability analysis must be carried out evaluating the properties of the fol-
lowing Jacobian matrix:
J =
264
@ _p
@p
@ _p
@q
@ _q
@p
@ _q
@q
375
whose trace and determinant are, respectively:
T (J) = +
s (n  1)
n (1  ) ;
(J) =
s [s+  (+ s)n]
n (1  ) :
the above expressions immediately imply that (i) (J) < 0 for all   1; so
that in this range we have saddle point stability, while (ii) T (J) > 0 for all
 2 (0; 1) ; whereby in this parameter region the steady state point is unstable
(either a focus or a node, depending on the sign of 4 (J)   T 2 (J)).2 This
concludes the proof.
2This implies that any convex demand gives rise to instability.
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The resulting per-rm prot in steady state is
 (n) =
 (+ s)
s

sA
s+ n (+ s)
+1

which is a function of the vertical intercept of demand, time discounting, the
number of rms, the degree of price stickiness and the curvature of demand. We
are now ready to assess the protability of a small horizontal merger.
2.4 The incentive to merge
Before delving into the details of the issue treated in this section, i.e., the incen-
tives toward horizontal mergers, it is worth discussing a feature of this problem
that is pervasive in the exinsting literature. Ever since Salant, Switzer and
Reynolds (1983), it is known that, in a Cournot game, outsiders not involved
in the merger are usually better o¤ than the merger partners precisely because
of the resulting increase in the degree of concentration in the industry. There-
fore, in principle there exists a question as to who should step out to propose
a merger, as every rm in the industry is aware that it would be convenient to
wait for some rivals to take such an initiative. Yet, if indeed this incentive is
there, one should expect to observe a merger proposal by some subset of the
rms in the industry. As is common to the entire literature on the matter, we
shall disregard this coordiantion problem and focus our attention on economic
incentives only.
The puzzle of bilateral mergers in a Cournot triopoly is a recurrent theme
in the debate on mergers, as observation suggests that indeed this is precisely
the type of merger one happens to observe in reality. For example, this has
been the case with the merger between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas that
has turned the world industry for large civil air transport into a duopoly, the
other competitor being Airbus. To tackle this issue, we set n = 3 and focus
on the protability of a merger involving two rms out of three. In a triopoly,
two rms will nd it protable to merge horizontally if and only if the following
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condition is satised:
 (n = 2)
2
   (n = 3) > 0
or, equivalently,
1
2

sA
s+ 2 (+ s)
+1
  

sA
s+ 3 (+ s)
+1

> 0:
That is, the fty percent of the individual duopoly prots once the merger has
taken place must be higher than the individual prots before the merger. Since
the level of the reservation price A is irrelevant, the above condition is indeed
equivalent to the following:
1
2

2+

2 +
1


s
 +1   3+ 3 + 1


s
 +1
> 0 (2.10)
The above condition can be studied in the space (; s=) : This is done in
Figure 1, where the region in which inequality (2.10) holds, or in other words
the merger of two out of three rms is protable, is represented by the area
below the curve.
This gure shows that if the market is su¢ ciently small (for all  < 0:42;
which is the asymptotic value attained if s= becomes innitely high), then the
incentive for a horizontal merger involving two rms out of three always exists
irrespective of speed of adjustment. The essential reason is that when demand
becomes convex, the market shrinks and this clearly hinders rmsprotability,
a fact which creates an incentive to merge. Interestingly, this result extends
to the static game for the same reason. If the prices adjusts instantaneously,
then the limit of the open-loop setup is the static model (the same happens if
 tends to zero). This can be veried simply by taking the static model and
compare it with the limit case where the ratio s= tends to innity (see Cellini
and Lambertini, 2004). Figure 1 clearly shows that, in the static game where
s= shoots up to innity, the merger is indeed protable for all  2 (0; 0:42).
However, this is the parameter range wherein the steady state point is un-
stable, so we have to ask ourselves whether a marger can be expected to arise
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for larger values of , in such a way that the resulting equilibrium be a saddle
point. As the market becomes larger (i.e.,  increases), the incentive to merge is
determined by how fast the price adapts to the equilibrium level. In fact, it turns
out that the protability of the merger is driven by a sort of tradeo¤ between
the curvature of demand and the speed of price adjustment (weighted for the
discount rate): as the market enlarges, the price has to become stickier in order
for forms to be willing to merge. Put it di¤erently, for comparatively higher
values of  one would be tempted to exclude investigating the merger incentive
because operating in a larger market increases the stand-alone protability and
this points in the direction of making bilateral mergers unprotable, all else
equal. This is not the case if the increase in  goes along with a decrease in s=:
The intuition behind this mechanism can be spelled out as follows. When price
adjusts very slowly, this involves making large systematic mistakes in setting the
output levels. Firms would like to play the correct Cournot equilibrium with a
large market but they cannot because s is very small and there they have an
incentive to decrease the number of rms to recover what they are losing. This
creates a region where  > 1 and s= is su¢ ciently small to yield convenient
bilateral mergers, as Figure 1 indeed illustrates.
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Figure 1 : Merger protability in the space (; s=)
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The problem can also be approached from another angle, namely, by xing
s= and then evaluating the protability of a merger involving m rms out of
n. In such a case, the prot incentive exists i¤:
 (n m+ 1)
m
   (n) > 0
or, equivalently,
1
m

1
s+  (n m+ 1) (+ s)
+1
  

1
s+ n (+ s)
+1

> 0 (2.11)
Condition (2.11) is assessed in Figure 2, where it yields a parametric family
of curves, between the two curves depicted here, with the characteristic that
the region where the merger is protable, which is bellow the curves, enlarges
if stickiness and discounting become higher which make sense according to the
aforementioned reasons.
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Figure 2 : Merger protability in the space (m;)
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This gure says that if  is sharply below 1, a small merger is indeed privately
convenient. This makes sense because market size shrinks as  decreases. Now,
if the market becomes smaller, because the demand from linear becomes convex,
it becomes less protable. Consequently, it is easier to nd conditions whereby
a small merger works. Therefore, for a given initial population of rms, say
10, if they are squeezed inside a very small market, then some of them nd
it protable to merge because their prots are squeezed by the decrease in ;
while they would not if the market were larger. In the linear case when  is
equal to 1 (along the at line drawn in Figure 2), we know from Salant, Switzer
and Reynolds (1983) that a protable merger must involve about 80% of the
oligopolist, which is dramatically close to a merger to monopoly.
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2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the consequences of horizontal mergers taking
a di¤erential game approach with sticky prices where the demand function is
nonlinear. Given the shape of the problem at hand, we have analyzed the open-
loop solution only.
E¢ ciency implications being ruled out by assumption, in our model it is
clear that any decrease in the number of rms brings about a decrease in social
welfare via a decrease in consumer surplus. Given the fact that, in principle,
when there is no saving on the overall industry costs, any horizontal merger
is socially harmful, then the regulator must look out for mergers driven by the
pressure generated by market size on rms, when the demand is non-linear. This
has some interesting implications on the empirical side, as estimating market
demand functions may indeed yield clearcut hints as to whether the market
under consideration is likely to generate incentives towards horizontal mergers.
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Chapter 3
Exogenous Output
Constraint in a Dynamic
Oligopoly
3.1 Introduction
Consider an industry consisting of N symmetric rms each producing a ho-
mogenous output. Then, the output levels of a subset of M (< N) rms are
constrained into a constant level. If the remaining rms simultaneously make
the best reply to this exogenous constraint, we want to investigate under what
circumstances is this to the benet of constrained subset.
In a series of papers Gaudet and Salant (1991a,b) show that, in the case of
Cournot competition among producers of perfect substitutes, a marginal con-
traction is strictly benecial if and only if the number of rms in the designated
subset exceeds the "adjusted" number of rms outside it by strictly more than
one. In the special case of linear cost and demand functions, the rms in the
subset will gain from an exogenously marginal contraction of their output if and
only if they outnumber the rms outside the subset by more than one.
In this paper we generalize this result to the case of dynamic competition
instead of looking at the one-shot game. While in the standard Cournot model
any output constraint is not to the benet of constrained rms, in this paper,
we show that when rms play a dynamic Cournot game with Markov-perfect
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strategies exogenous output constraint by a subset of rms results in: (i) increase
in the value of unconstrained rms irrelevant of the amount of constraint because
of having less intensive competition, (ii) increase in the market price for any
output constraint below the optimal level and slightly above that because of
reduction in the total output caused by less competition and (iii) increase in the
value of constrained rms for a viable range of parameters and initial conditions
because of increasing the price during the price path.
Our analysis has some applications to voluntary export restraints (VER),
Mergers, Economics Sanctions, etc. Mai and Hwang (1988) examine VERs in
a static duopoly model by using a conjectural variations approach. They nd
that if the free trade equilibrium is Cournot, a VER set at the free trade level of
imports will have no impact on prots. We show that if the free trade equilib-
rium is Cournot played with Markovian (subgame-perfect) strategies, then the
imposition of a VER at the free trade level of imports increases the market price
and the prots of the foreign and domestic rm. Hence, the VER is voluntary
in the dynamic Cournot model.
Suppose that the subset of rms represents rms that are part of a cartel.
Our study explains how it is to their benet when they agree on producing a
constant level of quantity, for example thier optimal steady state level of output
before the merger.
Consider the international market in which a group of countries are exporting
a specic good. Now, assume that one of these exporting countries is sanctioned
by part (not all) of the importing countries. This imposed economic sanction
force that country to be constrained to a lower output level which, however,
can be to her advantage. Our analysis characterizes circumstances under which
economic sanctions are not e¤ective.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2, present the model.
In section 3, the dynamic equilibria are derived before and after the exogenous
output constraint. Circumstances under which the exogenous output constraint
is protable is examined in section 4. In section 5, robustness of the result is
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checked by conjectural variations equilibrium. Some applications are presented
in section 6. Finally, section 7 concludes the paper.
3.2 A dynamic oligopoly model
Consider a dynamic oligopoly market consisting of N symmetric rms each
producing a homogenous output. Firms are assumed to produce with strictly
concave technologies described by the cost functions
C(qi(t)) =
1
2
q2i (t); i = 1; :::; N; (3.1)
where qi(t)  0 is the output of rm i produced at time t. The equilibrium price,
p(t), in period t is related to industry output by means of an inverse demand
function which in its linear version is given by
p(t) = a 
NX
i=1
qi(t) (3.2)
where the units of measurement are chosen such that the slope of the demand
curve is -1. Thus, the single period prot function of rm i is given by
i(t) = [a 
NX
i=1
qi(t)]qi(t)  1
2
q2i (t): (3.3)
Equation (3.3) represents a classical one-shot Cournot game. However, in this
paper we want to look at the continuous time dynamic competition where rms
are assumed to maximize the discounted stream of prots over an innite plan-
ning horizon with r > 0 as the constant discount rate. We are interested in
deriving Markov-perfect equilibria for this game. In order to solve for those
equilibria, we make use of the "sticky price" model introduced by Fershtman
and Kamien (1987). It is given by
maxi =
Z 1
0
e rtfp (t) qi (t)  1
2
q2i (t)gdt; (3.4)
subject to
_p (t) = s[a 
NX
i=1
qi (t)  p (t)]; p (0) = p0: (3.5)
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In (3.4) and (3.5) it is assumed that the actual market price deviates from its
level given by the demand function but moves towards it with a constant speed
of adjustment denoted by s (0 < s  1). Thus, we have sticky prices.
The strategy spaces available to the rms should be specied in order to
clearly dene the dynamic Cournot game (3.4). The assumption that the in-
dustry equilibrium is identied as a subgame-perfect Cournot equilibrium in
Markov strategies means that rms design their optimal policies as decision
rules dependent on the state variables of the game (in our case price). This
means that rms take into account the rivals reactions to their own actions as
expressed by the state variables of the game. This is exactly the characteristic
present in the case of conjectural variations equilibrium.
3.3 Dynamic equilibria
As motivated in the introduction, we are interested to see whether rms benet
from being forced to act non-strategically or not. To this end, in this section
we want to derive the dynamic equilibrium of game (3.4) under two di¤erent
scenarios. First, we solve for the equilibrium when all theN rms in the industry
are strategic players. Next, we consider the scenario where M strategic players
are eliminated by being forced to be constrained to a constant level of output
and we derive the equilibrium in this scenario.
If value of non-strategic rm increases compared to the unconstrained case,
the answer to the question is yes. This is what we focus on in next section.
3.3.1 Unconstrained oligopoly equilibrium
We derive the equilibrium of the model in which rms employ price depen-
dent decision rules when maximizing their discounted prots. Thus, changes in
the market price stimulate responses by all players that are reected in their
quantity choices. This corresponds to the recognized interdependence present
in oligopolistic markets.
Theorem 4 There exists a Markov perfect equilibrium of the sticky price
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model in an N rm dynamic Cournot oligopoly given by
q (p) = p(1  sK) + sE; (3.6)
V (p) = 12Kp
2   Ep+ g; (3.7)
and
p(t) = p + (p0   p)eDt; (3.8)
where p0 is the initial price and p is the steady state price
p =
a NsE
1 +N(1  sK) ; (3.9)
K, E, g and D are dened as
K =
2s(N + 1) + r  
q
[2(N + 1)s+ r]
2   4s2(2N   1)
2s2(2N   1) ; (3.10)
E =
 sKa
s(N + 1) + r   s2K(2N   1) ; (3.11)
g =
s2E2(2N   1)  2sEa
2r
; (3.12)
D = s[N(sK   1)  1]: (3.13)
Proof. See Appendix A.
The results of Theorem 1 have the following implications. Firstly, the equi-
librium quantities of the innite horizon game do not coincide with that of the
one shot game if rms employ Markov strategies. Secondly, rms produce more
(and hence market price is lower) in the dynamic game compared to the classical
Cournot model. The interpretation of this result arises from the price depen-
dent decision rules (3.6). In particular, with an increase in price rms react by
producing more. To see why this causes equilibrium quantities to be closer to
the competitive equilibrium consider the following scenario. Assume that a rm
i nds it protable to reduce its equilibrium quantity. This causes the market
price to increase. Given the feedback decision rules of the competitors their op-
timal response to the increasing price is to increase their equilibrium quantities
thus o¤setting rm is action. This behavior causes in equilibrium all rms to
produce beyond the level of simple Cournot quantities.
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3.3.2 Exogenous output constraint
After having characterized the unconstrained equilibrium we assume that a sub-
set of M (M < N) strategic players are eliminated by being constrained to a
constant level of output, q (0 < q < a). Moreover, we assume that these rms
cannot deviate as they are constrained to these output levels. Thus, the game
played by the N  M strategic players in the model of sticky prices becomes
maxCi =
Z 1
0
e rtfp (t) qi (t)  1
2
q2i (t)gdt; i =M + 1; :::; N; (3.14)
subject to
_p (t) = s[a M q  
NX
i=M+1
qi (t)  p (t)]; p (0) = p0: (3.15)
This provides us with the following result.
Theorem 5 If a subset of M rms in an N rm dynamic Cournot oligopoly
is forced to act non-strategically through being exogenously constrained to the
output choices q, there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium of the sticky price
model, where the remaining N M rms play strategically the dynamic Cournot
game, given by
~q (p) = p^(1  sK^) + sE^: (3.16)
V^ (p) = 12K^p
2   E^p+ g^; (3.17)
and
p^(t) = ~p+ (p0   ~p)eD^t; (3.18)
where p0 is the initial price and ~p is the steady state price
~p =
a  (N  M)sE^  M q
1 + (N  M)(1  sK^) ; (3.19)
K^, E^, g^ and D^ are dened as
K^ =
2s(N  M + 1) + r  
q
[2(N  M + 1)s+ r]2   4s2(2(N  M)  1)
2s2(2(N  M)  1) ;
(3.20)
E^ =
 sK^a  sK^M q
s(N  M + 1) + r   s2K^(2(N  M)  1) ; (3.21)
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g^ =
s2E^2(2(N  M)  1)  2sE^a+ 2sE^M q
2r
: (3.22)
D^ = s[(N  M)(sK^   1)  1]: (3.23)
And the present value of a non-strategic rm becomes
V^ C = Ap+ g^C ; (3.24)
where A and g^C are
A =
q
r   D^ ;
g^C =
q(D^(2~p  q) + rq)
2r(D^   r) :
Proof. See Appendix B.
It is important to note, however, that the behavior of the rms in the
subset after being non-strategic does not correspond to an equilibrium. The
strategically-playing rms, however, are in dynamic Cournot equilibrium.
3.4 Protable output constraint
Theorem 6 Assume that the subset of M strategic players are eliminated by
being exogenously constrained to the output choices q, whereas the remaining
N  M rms react strategically to this exogenous change in a dynamic Cournot
game with Markov-perfect strategies. This results in an
(a) increase in the market price for any q  q;
(b) increase in the present value of strategic rms irrespective of the amount
of q;
(c) increase in the present value of non-strategic rms for a viable range of
parameters and initial conditions.
Proof. See Appendix C.
However, the steady state price ~p could be larger than p even for some
values of q above the q. Consider q = q where  > 0, therefore, we have
~p > p () 0 <  <  ND^
Ms
  (N  M)D(a(1  sK^) + sE^)
Ms(a(1  sK) + sE) ;
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The expression in the right hand side of the inequality is always greater than 1,
for all plausible amounts of parameters. The thinner curve in gure 1 represents
the ranges of parameters in the space of (M;), for a given values of other
parameters, where the two steady state prices, ~p and p, are equal. In the region
below the curve ~p is larger than p. Therefore, the market price in constrained
equilibrium at every instant is higher compared to unconstrained equilibrium.
Figure 1: Protability of acting non-strategically for the rms in the subset.
On the dashed line  = 1 (q = q). On the thin solid curve ~p = p and
below (above) it, is larger (smaller) than p. Beyond the two thick solid
curves exogenous output constraint is never protable for non-strategic rms.
-
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1
0
M

1
I
II
III
In gure 1, in the regions between the thick curves, non-strategic rms can
benet from an exogenous output constraint. In the region II constrained rms
benet by producing more and selling them at a higher price at every instant.
In the region I, while constrained rms are constrained to a large output level,
they can still benet since D < D^ < 0 and, therefore, price in constrained
equilibrium moves to its steady state level more slowly. Region III, represents
the points where excluding some of strategic players from the game make the
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competition in the industry less aggressive and pushes the price up in such a way
that constrained rms benet even with a substantial decrease in their quantity.
Figures 2: Comparing the value functions of a non-strategic rm
before (V , the curve) and after (V^ c, the straight line)
the exogenous output constraint.
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However, provided that the parameters characterize a point in region I, II
or III, the protability of output constraint depends on the initial condition
and how far the initial price is di¤erent from the steady state level. This is
shown in gures 2. In gures 2 (i) and 2 (ii), if the initial price belongs to
(0; pa) (or (pb; pa)), we can argue that V^ C (p) always has a larger value than
V (p). Whereas, in the case where p0 is outside the (0; pa) (or (pb; pa)) , output
constraining is not to the benet of the non-strategic rms in so far as p^(t)
arrives to the interval and it becomes protable afterwards. Figures 2 (iii) and
2 (iv) corresponds to the points beyond the thick curves in gure 1 and illustrate
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the case where constrained rms do not benet for any initial condition.
Note that, in our analysis, we consider general output constraint q > 0 and
examine the protability of it in a dynamic context. However, at the steady
state and for output constraint q = q, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 7 The steady state prots of non-strategic rms increase when they
are constrained to their equilibrium output level q.
Proof. As it was indicated before, after eliminating some strategic players,
the steady state price increases (~p > p). Therefore, since the output level does
not change, the rms revenue will increase while the cost remains the same as
before. Hence, the non-strategic rms make higher prots in steady state.
3.5 Robustness of results
We have shown that, in a dynamic Cournot oligopoly when rms employ Markov-
ian strategies, eliminating a subset of strategic players from the competition
can be to the benet of all the strategic and non-strategic players. Although
we make use of the sticky price model, results do not correspond to the price
stickiness. In this section, the robustness of results is evaluated through a conjec-
tural variations analysis.1 As it is shown in Dockner (1992), a static conjectural
variations analysis approximates long-run dynamic interactions. Hence, we are
interested in conjectural variations equilibrium in both unconstrained and con-
strained cases, and, then, examining the protability of being a non-strategic
player.
In the unconstrained equilibrium, all rms are strategic players. Firms have
symmetric prot functions given by
i = p(Q)qi   C(qi); (3.25)
where Q is the industry output, p(Q) is a general inverse demand curve and
C(qi) is a general cost function. First order conditions in the case of conjectural
1The conjectural variation is the rms conjectures about her rivalsbehavior.
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variations equilibrium are given by
@i
@qi
= p(Q) + p0(Q)qi   C 0(qi) + p0(Q)qi[
NP
j=1;j 6=i
@qj
@qi
] = 0; (3.26)
where @qj@qi is the conjecture of rm i about rm js behavior. The industry
output, price and cost functions are assumed to be Q =
PN
i=1 qi, p(Q) = a Q
and C(qi) = 12q
2
i , respectively. Thus, the equilibrium corresponding to the
F.O.C. of (3.26) is
qcv =
a
2 +N +  (N   1) ;
where the subscript cv denotes the conjectural variations equilibrium, and rms
are presumed to have identical conjectures  = ij =
@qj
@qi
. This conjecture be-
longs to the interval [0; 0] where 0 2 ( 1; 0) is the minimum viable conjecture
which solves  = pcvq

cv  12q2cv = 0, and  = 0 replicates the standard Cournot
oligopoly.
However, in a consistent conjecture equilibrium (CCE)2 , the conjectural vari-
ation must be equal to the reaction function. The rms reaction function is the
rms actual behavior and is dened by qi = i (qj) which solves (3.26). The
implicit di¤erentiation of (3.26) yields
[1 + (+ 1) (N   1)] @i
@qj
p0(Q) + p0(Q)  @i
@qj
= 0:
Considering symmetric reaction functions, @i@qj =
@
@q and equating conjectural
variation and reaction function, i.e. @@q = , the consistent conjecture is ob-
tained3
 =  N + 1 
p
5 +N (N   2)
2N   2 :
It can be easily shown that  2 (0; 0). Therefore, the slope of consistent
conjecture lies between  1 and 0 which refer to Bertrand and Cournot compe-
titions. Hence, in a CCE, the competition among rms in an oligopoly is more
aggressive compared to the Cournot.
2Consistent conjectures equilibrium is discussed comprehensively in Bresnahan (1981).
3There exists a second root which is lower than  1 and is not acceptable.
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Now, we want to know the consequences of excluding a subset of strategic
players from the competition. Let us force a subset of M rms to be non-
strategic players by constraining them to a constant output levels q where this
constraint is binding. Thus, the remaining N  M strategic rms solve the rst
order conditions
@i
@qi
= p(Q) + p0(Q)qi   C 0(qi) + p0(Q)qi[
NP
j=M+1;j 6=i
@qj
@qi
] = 0: (3.27)
Evaluating this rst order condition along the equilibrium of (3.26) yields
@i
@qi

q=qcv
=  p0(Q)qcv[
MP
j=1;j 6=i
@qj
@qi
] < 0: (3.28)
This, however, implies (given the second order conditions) that industry out-
put shrinks when a subset of rms is constrained to their equilibrium in the
unconstrained case. Hence, market price increases and both strategic and non-
strategic players benet, irrespective of the size of the M .
Now, consider a general output constraint q = qcv,  2 (0; 2). Assuming
symmetry between the N  M strategic players, the equilibrium output level of
(3.27) becomes
~qcv =
a (2 +N + (N   1) M)
(2 +N +  (N   1)) (N  M + 2 +  (N  M   1)) ;
and the resulting market price is
~pcv = a Mqcv   (N  M) ~qcv:
Therefore, the unconstrained and constrained rmsprots are
~ = ~pcv~qcv   1
2
~q2cv; (3.29)
~c = ~pcvq   1
2
q2; (3.30)
where ~ denotes the prots in constrained case, and subscript c stands for the
constrained rms.
Figure 3 shows the range of parameters in the space of (; ) where un-
constrained and constrained rms can benet from output constraint. The two
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Figure 3.1: Protability of exogenous output constraint in conjectural variations
equilibrium in the space of (; ). The lower curve and the upper one represent
the points where rmsprots in the two cases are equal for the constrained
and unconstrained rms, respectively. On the right hand side of the curves
both type of ms benet.
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curves in this gure are the locus of the points where rms have the same prots
in unconstrained and constrained equilibria. However, the gray area represents
the points where both type of rms benet while in the dotted area only con-
strained rms benet.
As it can be seen, rmsprots can increase even if they are constrained
to an output level higher than the unconstrained equilibrium. The protability
of output constraint decreases as rmsconjectures goes to zero. These results
are consistent with the results of the dynamic competition when rms employ
Markovian strategies.
In the gure,  = 0 corresponds to the standard static Cournot competition
in which any output constraint in not benecial neither for the constrained rms
nor for the unconstrained ones.
3.6 Applications
3.6.1 Voluntary export restraints
The study we have conducted has many applications among which voluntary
export restraints (VERs) is the most obvious one. It is of importance to inter-
national trade policy to answer the question whether domestic and/or foreign
rms benet from the imposition of so-called voluntaryexport restraints by
the foreign producer. If the foreign producers prot increases by restraining
export to the domestic market, VERs are indeed voluntary.
Dockner and Haug (1991) analyses VERs in a di¤erential game model with
a domestic and foreign producer of a homogenous good sold in the domestic
market. There are several di¤erences between this contribution and present
study. First, Dockner and Haug (1991) analysis is restricted in a speed of
price adjustment that goes to innity. However, in our model it is possible to
investigate price behavior in determining the protability of VERs. Second, with
the model presented here we can consider more than one foreign and domestic
rm which provides us the chance to examine the incentive for VER in relation
to the number of constrained rms and the level of output they are constrained
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In addition to Dockner and Haug (1991) that shows the imposition of a VER
at the free trade level of imports increases the market price and the prots of
all rms in the industry, our analysis implies that: market price increases for
any output constraint which in below the free trade level of imports; it is always
to the benet of domestic rms for any level of exports that foreign rms are
restricted to and nally in part (c) of theorem 5 it is comprehensively explained
under which conditions and for what level of output export restraint is protable
for foreign rms.
3.6.2 Horizontal Mergers and Cartels
When in an N -rm industry a subset of M rms is constrained to a constant
level of output, since there is strategic interaction among N M+1 rms rather
than N rms, the level of competition in the industry will decrease which is
always to the benet of unconstrained rms as it is proved in theorem 5. We
show when the subset of rms are constrained to q* which is their steady state
equilibrium level before the exogenous output constrained, the anticompetitive
forces due to an exogenous output constraint can be strong enough to benet
the subset of rms as well. Theorem 5 also discusses about conditions and other
output levels that being constrained to it can be advantageous for the subset of
rms.
The same story holds when we consider the protability of mergers and
cartels. Our model does not precisely t the horizontal merger problem in which
rms solve their strategic problem to determine the equilibrium output level.
However, in general, output contraction creates the same results that horizontal
mergers and cartels can create that are reduction in aggregate output, increase
in the market price and therefore increase in the prot of N  M outside rms.
Now, assume that the subset represents rms that are part of a cartel. Here, we
4For another contribution on VERs in a di¤erential game you can see Calzolari and Lam-
bertini (2007) who study the impact of VERs in a duopoly game with a Ramsey capital
accumulation dynamics
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can dene cartel as an agreement in which rms in the subset agree on being
constrained to a constant level of output (for example q) and as it is shown in
theorem 5, it can be protable for them. It is di¢ cult for antitrust authority
to recognize such a cartel in which a subset of rms is constrained to their
steady state equilibrium level before the exogenous output constraint. Dockner
and Gaunersdorfer (2001), Benchekroun (2003), Esfahani (2012) and Esfahani
and Lambertini (2012)5 using a dynamic model with sticky prices, investigate
the protability of horizontal mergers in the specic case of instantaneous price
adjustment.
3.6.3 Economic sanctions
Economic sanctions are punishments imposed on a country by one or a group
of countries due to various reasons. Economic sanctions may take a number of
forms including: embargo on exports, embargo on imports, nancial controls,
transportation and communication controls, sequestration of property, preemp-
tive purchasing and other measures. For extensive discussion, see Bornstein
(1968).
We are considering import restrictions from the target country into the par-
ticipants which attempts to reduce the target countrys foreign exchange earn-
ings. There is a debate over the e¤ectiveness of economic sanctions in their
ability to achieve its intention even if any import restrictions enacted by sanc-
tioners ensures income reduction in target country. However, our analysis can
address the question of whether sanctions can reduce the target countrys in-
come.
Suppose thatM rms in the subset represent rms in the target country. The
rest of the N  M Firms are outside the target country. Sanctioning countries
by enforcing import restrictions are the cause of exogenous output constraint
in the target country. Part (c) of theorem 5 explains how sanctions can be
designed by imposing countries in order to decrease the present value of rms
5They considered non-linear demand function and the open-loop equilibrium.
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in the imposed country through the level of output that they force the target
country to be constrained to.
3.7 Conclusion
In the case of static Cournot competition among producers of perfect substi-
tutes, output constraint is never to the benet of constrained rms. When rms
use feedback strategies, eliminating a subset of strategic players by exogenously
constrained them to a constant level of output results in: (i) increase in the value
of strategic rms irrelevant of the amount of constraint because of having less
intensive competition, (ii) increase in the market price for any output constraint
below the optimal level and slightly above that because of total output reduc-
tion caused by less competition and (iii) increase in the value of non-strategic
rms for a viable range of parameters and initial conditions because of increase
in the price during the price path.
APPENDIX
Appendix A:
Proof of Theorem 1: The proof is carried out for symmetric interior
solutions. We use dynamic programming. The Bellman equation is given by
rV i (p) = max
qi
fpqi   1
2
q2i + sV
i
p (p) [a 
NX
i=1
qi   p]g; (3.31)
where V i (p) is the optimal value function of rm i. Since the game is symmetric
and linear quadratic we conjecture symmetric, quadratic value functions
V i (p) = 12Kp
2   Ep+ g; (3.32)
which implies that
V ip (p) = Kp  E; (3.33)
where K, E and g are constants that need to be determined. Maximizing the
right hand side of equation (3.31) gives
qi = p  sV ip (p) : (3.34)
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Thus, the feedback rules are given by
qi (p) = p(1  sK) + sE: (3.35)
Substituting this last expression and using the quadratic value function (3.32)
into the Bellman equation yields
1
2p
2
 
1  rK   2sK(N + 1) + s2K2(2N   1)
+ p(asK + E(r + s) + sNE   s2EK(2N   1))
+ s2E2(2N   1)  sEa  rg = 0: (3.36)
The requirement that this equation be satised for all values of p implies that
K, E and g have to satisfy
1  rK   2sK(N + 1) + s2K2(2N   1) = 0; (3.37)
asK + E(r + s) + sNE   s2EK(2N   1) = 0; (3.38)
s2E2(2N   1)  sEa  rg = 0: (3.39)
The solutions to equations (3.37)-(3.39) are given by
K =
2s(N + 1) + r 
q
[2(N + 1)s+ r]
2   4s2(2N   1)
2s2(2N   1) ; (3.40)
E =
c  sKa
s(N + 1) + r   s2K(2N   1) ; (3.41)
g =
s2E2(2N   1)  2sEa
2r
: (3.42)
With the decision rules (3.35) the price equation (3.5) becomes
_p+ ps[N(1  sK) + 1] = s(a NsE); (3.43)
which is a linear rst order di¤erential equation. A solution to this equation is
given by
p(t) = p + (p0   p)eDt; (3.44)
where p is the steady state price
p =
a NsE
1 +N(1  sK) ; (3.45)
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p0 is the initial price and D is the constant
D = s[N(sK   1)  1]:
This constant is only negative, and hence the Markov-perfect equilibrium is
globally stable if we choose the negative root of (3.40). Equations (3.35) and
(3.40) to (3.45) give us the Markov-perfect equilibrium in linear strategies for
the di¤erential game (3.4) and (3.5) for any nite s. This completes the proof.
Appendix B:
Proof of Theorem 2: The Bellman equation of the problem (3.14)-(3.15)
is given by
rV^ i (p) = max
qi
fpqi   1
2
q2i + sV^
i
p (p) [a 
MX
j=1
qj  
NX
i=M+1
qi   p]g; (3.46)
where V^ i (p) is the optimal value function of rm i, which is an unconstrained
rm in the constrained case. Maximization of the right hand side of the Bellman
equation gives
q^i (p) = p  sV^ ip (p) ; (3.47)
Substituting (3.47) into (3.46) and inducing symmetry yields
rV^ (p) = p(p  sV^p (p))  1
2
(p  sV^p (p))2 (3.48)
+sV^p (p) [a  p M q   (N  M)(p  sV^p (p))]:
As with the unconstrained case, we propose the following quadratic value func-
tion
V^ (p) = 12K^p
2   E^p+ g^;
which implies that
V^p (p) = K^p  E^;
where K^, E^ and g^ are constants that need to be determined. Thus, the feedback
rules are given by
q^i (p) = p(1  sK^) + sE^: (3.49)
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Substituting V^ (p) and V^p (p) in (3.48) and collecting with respect to p, we
obtain
1p
2 + 2p+ 3 = 0; (3.50)
where
1 =
1
2

1  rK^   2sK^(N  M + 1) + s2K^2(2(N  M)  1)

; (3.51)
2 = asK^+E^(r+2s)+sE^(N M 1) sK^M q s2E^K^(2(N M) 1); (3.52)
3 = s
2E^2(N  M   12 ) + sE^M q   sE^a  rg^: (3.53)
The equation (3.50) is satised if expressions (3.51)-(3.53) are simultaneously
zero. This results to the following solution
K^ =
2s(N  M + 1) + r 
q
[2(N  M + 1)s+ r]2   4s2(2(N  M)  1)
2s2(2(N  M)  1) ;
(3.54)
E^ =
 sK^a  sK^M q
s(N  M + 1) + r   s2K^(2(N  M)  1) ;
g^ =
s2E^2(2(N  M)  1)  2sE^a+ 2sE^M q
2r
:
Using (3.49), a solution to equation (3.15) is given by
p^(t) = ~p+ (p0   ~p)eD^t;
where ~p is the steady state price
~p =
a  (N  M)sE^  M q
1 + (N  M)(1  sK^) ;
p0 is the initial price and D^ is the constant
D^ = s[(N  M)(sK^   1)  1]:
This constant is only negative and if we choose the negative root of (3.54) the
Markov-perfect equilibrium is globally stable.
The discounted present value of the constrained rm is derived from
V^ C (p(t)) =
Z 1
t
e r( t)[p()  1
2
q]qd ; (3.55)
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where V^ C is the value function of the constrained rms and p(:) is the price
given by (3.18). Substituting (3.18) in (3.55), we have
V^ C (p(t)) = ertq
Z 1
t
e r (~p  1
2
q)d +
Z 1
t
e (r D) (p0   ~p)d

; (3.56)
which results to
V^ C =
1
r
(~pq   1
2
q2) +
1
r   D^ (p0   ~p)qe
D^t; (3.57)
Thus, we obtain
V^ C = Ap+ g^C ;
where A and g^C are
A =
q
r   D^ ;
g^C =
q(D^(2~p  q) + rq)
2r(D^   r) :
This proves the theorem.
Appendix C:
Proof of Theorem 3: Looking at (3.10) and (3.20), it is obvious that K
and K^ have the same functional form with this di¤erence that instead of N we
have N  M in K^. Thus, since it can be easily shown that @K=@N < 0, we nd
that K^ > K > 0. We have the similar story to compare E with E^ and g with
g^. Substituting (3.10) in (3.11), we can show that @E=@N > 0. Thus, as the
number of rms decreases the coe¢ cient E will decrease. This together with
having the negative term  sK^M q in equation (3.21) we can argue that, as long
as q is positive, E^ < E < 0. With the same procedure we can show that always
g^ > g > 0. Therefore, comparing (3.7) and (3.17), for all values of p we obtain
V^ (p) > V (p). This concludes (b).
Considering (3.10) and (3.20), it can be easily shown that for all values
of parameters sK < sK^ < 1. So, comparing (3.13) and (3.23), we nd that
D < D^ < 0. Furthermore, looking at steady state prices it can be shown that
for q  q, the steady state price (3.19) is larger than (3.9). Therefore, it can be
simply proven that the price path (3.18) is greater than (3.8) which concludes
(a).
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Now, in order to examine (c) we have to compare (3.7) and (3.24). Since
V (p) is a convex function and V^ C (p) is a linear function of p, by equating these
two equations, we obtain
pl =
A+ E p(A+ E)2   2K(g   g^C)
K
; l = a; b; (3.58)
where pa > pb (if there exist any pb). Therefore, in principal, for positive values
of p, the two value functions may have (i) one intersection if the radicand is
larger than zero and g^C > g, (ii) two intersections provided that the radicand
has a positive value and g > g^C , (iii) one tangency point when the radicand is
zero, and (iv) no intersection when the radicand is negative. Therefore, having
a viable range of parameters for which acting non-strategically is to the benet
of rms mainly depends on the amount of (A + E)2   2K(g   g^C). Here,
we are interested in its positive values. Using a numerical analysis, a range
of parameters in the space of (M;) is depicted in gure 1by means of two
dividing curves (the thicker ones) where between them the amount of radicand
is positive and beyond them it is negative. Situation (iv) corresponds to the
regions beyond the curves. However, in the region between the two curves, we
do have a viable range of parameters for output constraint to be protable for
the non-strategic rms which corresponds to (i) or (ii). Figures 2 show (i), (ii),
(iii) and (iv) graphically.
The condition (iii) occurs in the limit where s goes to zero, because we have
lim
s!0
(A+ E)2   2K(g   g^C) = 0;
and, therefore, there is a single common point in V (p) and V^ C (p). Furthermore,
the slope of V (p) at pa = A+EK isV
0 (p) = Kp E = A, which is the same as the
slope of V^ C (p). Thus, the contacting point is a tangency point. Hence, when
the price does not adjust at all (i.e. s = 0), acting non-strategically is never
to the benet of the non-strategic rms. However, for 0 < s < 1 there is a
range of parameters where the non-strategic rms also benet from the output
constraining. Comparing the steady state prices (3.9) and (3.19) and prices
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driven from (??), we found that
p < ~p 2

(0; pa) in (i),
(pb; pa) in (ii).
Now, looking at (3.18), we know that p^ starts at the initial price p0 and moves
towards the steady state price ~p. Therefore, provided that the initial price
belongs to (0; pa) (or (pb; pa)), we can argue that V^ C (p) always has a larger
value than V (p). Whereas, in the case where p0 is outside the aforementioned
interval, output constraining is not to the benet of the non-strategic rms in
so far as p^(t) arrives to the interval and it becomes protable afterwards.
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Chapter 4
Strategic environmental
policies under international
competition with
asymmetric pollution
spillovers
4.1 Introduction
The environmental consequences of trade liberalization have received a consid-
erable attention in trade theory and environmental economics. International
trade is playing an important role in expanding global economic activities and,
therefore, many individuals have argued that trade liberalization will lead to an
increase in world pollution.
Although globalization brings about many benets and opportunities, some
environmentalists have resisted freer trade, because governments which are un-
able to use trade policy may lower their environmental standards to give com-
petitive advantage to existing domestic industries and protect their economy.
This has led some economists to investigate the relationship between trade and
the environment.1
The established literature on trade and environment suggests that, while
1Copeland and Taylor (2003) provides a comprehensive review of the link between trade
and the environment.
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each country can gain from trade, it expands global pollution. Fujiwara (2009)
investigates the e¤ects of free trade on global stock of pollution and he nds
that under trade liberalization the stock of pollution is larger as compared to
the autarky.
Another part of the literature deals with the links between strategic environ-
mental policies and the patterns of trade and pollution levels. Stem from the
Brander and Spencer (1985) model, Rauscher (1994), Kennedy (1994), Barrett
(1994), Walz and Wellisch (1997) and Tanguay (2001) all show that governments
can have incentives to use environmental policies to subsidize their exports. It
is benecial for rent-shifting governments to set an environmental tax below
the Pigouvian level in an international oligopoly. Such a weak environmental
regulation to support domestic rms has been called ecological dumping.
The aim of this study is to examine the welfare implications of trade liber-
alization when governments behave strategically using environmental policy in
the presence of transboundary pollution. However, we model the transbound-
ary pollution in such a way that it allows drawing the results also in pure local
pollution and global environmental problem.
In this paper, we consider two symmetric countries with a single rm in
each producing a homogenous good. The two rms may export a part of their
production to the other country. In our model trade of the same product occurs
between countries.2 Thereby, we have a two-stage game where in the rst stage
governments decide about the environmental and trade policies, and the two
rms compete a la Cournot in the second stage. The most important di¤erence
of this study with the aforementioned literature is that we allow for assymetric
environmental damages between the two countries in our model.
We nd that when the marginal cost of pollution of the domestic rm in-
creases, the pollution-shifting motive is enhanced and government wants to raise
production taxes and the rent-seeking behavior is observed and government
2Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983) showed that intraindustry trade occurs
because each rm perceives each country as a separate market and makes distinct output
decisions for each.
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raises import tari¤s. On the other hand, when the marginal cost of pollution of
the foreign rm increases, government want to reduce the level of tax and the
level of tari¤ as well.
In addition, contrary to existing literature, it is shown that the global pollu-
tion decreases in bilateral trade compared to autarky provided that the di¤er-
ence between the emission rates of the two rms is su¢ ciently large. This result
holds even for the case of pure local pollution. Furthermore, it is shown that
how the asymmetric pollution emissions a¤ects the rmsprot and countries
welfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs the general
framework of the model and describes autarkic equilibria. Section 3 devoted to
the rms equilibrium. In Section 4 we turn to the games between the two
governments. Comparing the trade equilibria with the autarkic equilibria takes
place in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
4.2 The fundamentals
4.2.1 The setup
There are two countries, indexed by i = 1; 2. In each country there is a rm
which produces a single output. Their productions, qi, have two parts:
qi = qhi + qei; i; j = 1; 2;
where qhi and qei denote the amounts of output produced by rm i and consumes
in the domestic market and is exported to the other country, respectively.
The inverse demand function in each country is
pi = a  (qhi + qej); i; j = 1; 2 and j 6= i;
where qej is the amount of good which is exported by the rm j into country i.
Production takes place at constant returns to scale (CRS), with a constant
marginal cost c which is summarized by the cost function Ci = cqi(t).
The production of rm i, qi, creates a constant per unit emission level, i.
While rms are homogenous in their cost functions, it is assumed that they are
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hetrogeneous in their environmental damage functions, Ei
Ei(qi) = iqi = i (qhi + qei) ; i; j = 1; 2;
which is not conned to the country where the production takes place and gives
rise to a transboundary pollution problem.
The foreign production results in a negative externality in home country at
the xed level  , per unit of its environmental damage. Hence, the negative
externality caused by home and foreign production in country i is
exi(qi; qj) = Ei(qi) +  Ej(qj):
where  2 [0; 1], and  = 0 denotes the case of pure local pollution and  = 1
denotes the case of pure global environmental problem.
In order to protect the environment, country i levies an environmental tax,
 i, on its polluting production and imposes a tari¤ , i,on imported items.
Hence, rm is instantaneous prots are
i = piqhi + pjqei   cqi    iqi   jqei; i; j = 1; 2 and j 6= i;
Tax revenues are distributed in the form of a lump sum to the consumers. Thus,
the social welfare in each country is the aggregate amount of rms prots, con-
sumer surplus, tax and tari¤ revenues minus negative environmental externality
caused by home and foreign rms productions:
Wi = i + CSi +  iqi + iqej   exi; (4.1)
where CSi = (qhi + qej)
2
=2:
4.2.2 The autarkic equilibrium
Now, we consider a closed economy where there is no trade between countries
and each rm is monopolist in its own country. Therefore, given the government
environmental policy  i, the rm i maximizes her monopolistic prot i =
piqi   cqi    iqi, i = 1; 2. By rst-order condition (FOC), we obtain qAi =
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1
2 (a  c   i) where the superscript A denotes the autarky. At the equilibrium,
rm is reaction to the tax policy is @qAi =@ i =  1=2.
In the autarky, the governments rst-best environmental policy is intro-
duced by the Pigovian tax Ai = i. Note that because of transboundary pol-
lution, the foreign rms production creates negative externality in the home
country but it is not a¤ected by the home government policy.
Therefore, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the autarky is
qAi =
1
2
(a  c  i) ; (4.2)
Ai =
1
4
(a  c  i)2 ; (4.3)
WAi =
3
8
(a  c  i)2  
1
2
 j
 
a  c  j

; (4.4)
EAi =
1
2
i (a  c  i) ; (4.5)
exAi = E
A
i +  E
A
j =
1
2

(a  c)  i +  j  2i    2j ; (4.6)
exAG = ex
A
i + ex
A
j =
1
2
(1 +  )

(a  c)  i + j  2i   2j ; j 6= i; (4.7)
where G denotes the global negative environmental externality.
4.3 Trade liberalization
In this section, we want to investigate the rms behavior and governvent policies
after trade liberalization. In what follows, we construct a two-stage game. In
the rst stage, governments determine the level of tax and tari¤ and in the
second stage, the two rms simultaneously choose their outputs.
4.3.1 The rmsequilibrium
By backward induction, we rst solve the two international Cournot competitors
problem when choosing their export and home production levels, qej and qhi
respectively. The problem facing rm i is
max
qhi;qei
i = (a  qhi   qej) qhi + (a  qhj   qei   j) qei   (c+  i) (qhi + qei) ;
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Taking the FOCs, we obtain the following reaction functions
@i
@qhi
= a  2qhi   qej   c   i = 0;
@i
@qei
= a  qhj   2qei   c   i   j = 0:
Solving the FOCs of both rms simultaneously, we nd
qCNhi =
1
3
(a  c  2 i +  j + i) ; (4.8)
qCNei =
1
3
(a  c  2 i +  j   2j) ; (4.9)
where CN denotes the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. From equations (4.8)-(4.9)
it is found that @qCNhi =@ i = @q
CN
ei =@ i =  2=3 < @qAi =@ i =  1=2, which
implies that, rst, the rm i reacts to the tax levied by the home government
by reducing her output and, second, this reaction is stronger compared to the
autarky. However, the rm reaction to the foreign tax is opposite. As the foreign
government increases the tax rate, the domestic rm enhances her output, i.e.
@qCNhi =@ j = @q
CN
ei =@ j > 0.
Furthermore, the level of import decreases as the government of the home
country increases the level of tari¤ (@qCNej =@i < 0), and, consequently, the
home rms production increases (@qCNhi =@i > 0).
4.3.2 The noncooperative government policies
Now, knowing the rms behavior in the second stage, we move to the rst
stage where the environmental taxes and tari¤s are determined by governments
as Stackelberg strategic leaders. The total welfare of each country is dened as
the summation of consumer surplus, the rms prots, tax and tari¤ revenues
minus the negative environmental externality caused by both home and foreign
rms. Thus, the governments problem in country i is dened
max
 i;i
WCNi = 
CN
i + CS
CN
i +  iq
CN
i + iq
CN
ej   exCNi : (4.10)
We consider a non-cooperative game where each country unilaterally make deci-
sion about the environmental tax and tari¤ to maximize its own national welfare,
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and ignores its impact on the other. This problem is done with governments
choosing their pollution tax  i and tari¤ i and knowing the reactions of both
rms in the second stage. Thus, the FOCs are
@WCNi
@ i
=
1
9
 
12i   6 j   7 i    j + 3i + 2j   4(a  c)

= 0;
@WCNi
@i
=
1
3
 
a  c  i + 2 j +  i    j   3i

= 0:
Solving the FOCs of the problems of both governments simultaneously, we nd
the equilibrium amount of pollution tax and tari¤
i =
1
96

167i   43j + 32 
 
i   2j
  28(a  c) ; (4.11)
i =
1
48

16(a  c) + 19i   35j + 16 
 
i + j

: (4.12)
As it can be seen from (4.11), @i =@i = (167 + 32 ) =96 > @
A
i =@i = 1,
therefore, as the rmsemission rates increase the home government increases
the tax level. And, surprisingly, this taxation is stronger as the rate of spill-over
rises. Futhermore, in the international competition, rms faces a stronger envi-
ronmental taxation compared to autarky. However, the governments reaction
to the incease in the foreign rms pollution is reduction in levied tax on his
home rm, i.e. @i =@j < 0. Also, interestingly, we can see that the equi-
librium level of tari¤ on imports increases with the domestic rate of pollution
production, i.e. @i =@i > 0. In addition, this tari¤ decreases when the foreign
pollution increases, @i =@j < 0. Furthermore, we can see that @

i =@ > 0
when j < i=2, and @

i =@ > 0.
Finally, the market equilibrium becomes
qhi =
1
96

52(a  c)  113i + 61j   32 
 
i   2j

;
qei =
1
96

20(a  c)  79i + 59j   32 
 
2i   j

:
Then the total output of rm i is
qi =
1
4

3(a  c)  8i + 5j   4 
 
i   j

: (4.13)
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Consequently, the negative externality produced by the home and foreign rms
in country i is
exTi = iq

i +  jq

j ; (4.14)
where T denotes the case of trade liberalization. Therefore, the global pollution
and the total negative externality caused by rmsproduction are
ETG = iq

i + jq

j ; (4.15)
exTG = (1 +  )E
T
G; (4.16)
where G stands for the global.
4.4 Trade vs autarky
In this section, we compare the autarkic equilibrium with the noncooperative
restricted trade equilibria. We want to know how the asymmetric pollution
spill-over makes some di¤erences.
4.4.1 Global pollution
Comparing (4.7) and (4.16), yields
exG = ex
T
G   exAG
=
1
4
(1 +  )
h
(a  c)  i + j  62i + 62j   10ij + 4  i   j2i :(4.17)
In the symmetric case where i = j = , we have exGji=j = 2 (1 +  ) (a  c  ).
Since from (4.2) we know that a   c     0, the total externality and globa
pollution in bilateral trade is larger than autarky. However, in the asymmetric
case i 6= j , there exists a range of parameter in which global pollution and
consequently total negative externality in the autarkic equilibrium are larger
than the restricted trade. In gure 1, for a given value of a   c, exG is de-
picted in the space of (i; j). In the region between the two curves exG is
positive, therefore, trade liberalization is detrimental for the environment if the
two rmsrates of emissions are almost equal. Note that the dotted line in this
and the following gures represent the points where i = j . On this points we
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have ETG > E
A
G , which is consistent with the existing literature with symmetric
emission rate.
Figure 1: Global pollution comparison.
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The region beyond the curves represents the points where ex < 0. There-
fore, for a wide range of asymmetric emission rates, trade liberalization not only
is not a bad news for the environment but also it could even make reduction
in the environmental damages. This result is contrary to the almost all of the
previous studies where they argue that trade liberalization leads to increase in
environmental pollution.
As it is shown in gure 1, as the rate at which pollution crosses borders,  ,
increases the region where the restricted trade is environmentally detrimental
shrinks. Thus, for a pure global environmental problem (i.e.  = 1) the re-
gion where international trade compared to autarky is environmental friendly
becomes even larger.
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4.4.2 Externality in home country
A part of the negative externality caused by polluting production is created
by the domestic rm and another part by the foreign rm because of having
transboundary pollution ( > 0). Therefore, in the case of autarky we still have
the negative environmental e¤ect of foreign rm activity. In order to compare
the negative externality in country i in the international trade framework with
the autarky, we should compare (4.6) with (4.14) which yields
exi = ex
T
i   exAi =
1
4
j

(a  c) + 5i   6j + 4 
 
i   j

: (4.18)
Figures 2: Negative externality comparison in country i where a)  = 0, b)  = 1=2, c)  = 1.
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It can be easily shown that in the case of international trade competition
environmental damages is larger than the autarky provided that i = j . For
the general values of emission rates, in gures 2, we have plotted exi in the
space of (i; j), for the case of: a) pure local pollution,  = 0, b) an exam-
ple of transboundary pollution,  = 1=2, and c) pure global pollution,  = 1.
In these gures, only in the regions between the two curves (in gure 2a, be-
tween the curve and vertical axis) trade will increase the negative environmental
externality in country i.
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4.4.3 Output
Considering (4.2) and (4.13), in gures 3, we have shown the region on the right
side of the ticker curves where rm i produces more in international competi-
tion. Thus, provided that the rm is pollution spill-over is su¢ ciently larger
than her rivals; her total production in the presence of international trade is
lower than the case of autarky. This is a very good news for environmental-
ist which even noncooperative environmental and trade policies make the more
environmentally ine¢ cient rm to reduce her production.
Figures 3: Total output comparison for rm i where a)  = 0, b)  = 1=2, c)  = 1.
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In the gures 3 and 4, the thinner lines represent the points where below
them qei < 0, and therefore, there is not any export by the rm i to the country
j.
4.4.4 Prots and welfare
Finally we want to examine the protability and welfare consequences of trade
liberalization.
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Figures 4: Prot and welfare comparison in country i where a)  = 0, b)  = 1=2, c)  = 1.
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Figures 4, in the space of (i; j), shows the regions inside the curves where
rms prot and social welfare of country i under the autarky are larger than
the ones in international competition. The lower curves represent the points
where rms prots in autarky and international trade are equal, and the upper
curves characterizes the points where the social welfare in autarky and trade
are the same. Consitent with the other studies, rms prots in the case of
symmetric pollution spill-overs decreases in trade liberalization. However, in
the case of asymmetric pollution spill-over, trade liberalization decreases the
rms prots provided that her pollution spill-over is su¢ ciently larger than her
rival in international competition.
In the case of pure local pollution, trade liberalization always increases total
welfare. As  increases the regions where rms prots in autarky is larger than
international trade shrink and the regions where social welfare in autarky is
larger than international trade expand. However, although in the presence of
transboundary pollution governments prefer autarky rather than international
competition when rms production functions are the same, they prefer restricted
trade where they use environmental and trade policies rather than autarky pro-
vided that the home rms pollution spill-over is lower than her rival.
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4.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we considered a two-country world model with a single polluting
rm in each country to examine the welfare implications of trade liberaliza-
tion when governments behave strategically using environmental policy with
asymmetric pollution spillovers. We investigated a second-best trade agreement
between two countries to examine the strategic behavior of governments in using
pollution taxes and tari¤s. We found that when the marginal cost of pollution
of the domestic rm increases, the pollution-shifting motive is enhanced and
government wants to raise production taxes and surprisingly the rent-seeking
behavior is observed and government raises import tari¤s. On the other hand,
when the marginal cost of pollution of the foreign rm increases, government
want to reduce the level of tax and interestingly the level of tari¤ as well.
Furthermore, it is shown that how the level of taxes may increase or decrease
when/as the rate at which pollution crosses borders rises. We also show that,
because of asymmetric pollution spill-over, the global pollution may decrease
after trade liberalization.
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